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FOREWORD 
The formation of The Asian American Assembly for Policy 
Research has been a welcome event to me for a number of reasons. 
First, because a knowledge of Asia among Americans continues to 
be inadequate, despite the long history of U.S. relations and 
initiatives with that continent. American perceptions of Asia have 
tended to be distorted by the cycles of history, fired-up at one 
moment by involvement in Asian wars, and then receding at 
another into the mists of isolationist reaction. Meanwhile, an 
expert elite of non-Asian Americans tends to impose views that 
can be precious, recondite and self-serving. The growing presence 
in the academic establishment of scholars of Asian origin is a 
resource which can elevate the validity of research and opinion in 
this process. And the Assembly can contribute to giving that 
resource a voice. 
Second, as the number of Asian immigrants to the U.S. 
accelerates, it has been becoming more and more important that 
they be assimilated into the fabric of American society. Before 
they form major interest groups which seek special advantage to 
overcome perceived discriminations, and thus add to a proliferat-
ing fragmentation of the American nation, they must be helped to 
understand their American surroundings, and thus to achieve 
Americanhood. The intellectual leadership among them has a role 
to play in this process, and the Assembly can help to focus on that 
role. 
Third, there has not been any commonality among Asian-
Americans to begin with. Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, 
Indians and the others see themselves as much distinct from each 
other as they do from other Americans. So the Assembly has a 
role in bringing them together, and in providing them with an 
opportunity to address common problems and to share common 
goals. 
I was pleased to accep_t Professor Winberg Chai's invitation to 
be chairman of the Ass~mbly's advisory council because a non-
Asian American component of such an undertaking is obviously 
indicated and because of my own identification with the values I 
have mentioned. The Henry Luce Foundation, Inc., of which I am 
president, fosters American knowledge of Asia through its 
Scholars Program, which gives young Americans of high 
potential a year's experience in Asia, and through its Asian 
Studies Program, which supports scholarly work in Asian-
American interactions at major university graduate centers. In 
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the field of recent Asian immigrants, China Institute in America, 
of which I am chairman, conducts bilingual vocational training 
programs. 
The papers in the present volume (abstracts) are those which 
were submitted to the Assembly's conference in New York in 
April, 1977. They bring to bear new insights to that major 
question of U.S. foreign policy- relations with China. While their 
authors share a commonality of their Chinese ethnicity, they are 
also broadly representative of the various approaches to the issues 
involved. Together, they form a body of thought which helpfully 
contributes to this complex subject. 
I look forward to the publication of additional reports on other 
subjects from the Assembly's conferences. 
Henry Luce III 
Preface 
The foundation of the Asian American Assembly was begun 
in 1972 when the City College of New York received an initial 
grant of $25,000 from the Field Foundation of New York to help 
the Department of Asian Studies in developing a "viable City 
College-run community service program for Chinatown." One 
year later, President Robert E. Marshak provided an additional 
$6,000 from the City College Fund to expand the college-run 
community service program. In 1976, the City College received a 
second $25,000 grant from the Field Foundation to continue 
community related projects, including the establishment of the 
Asian American Assembly for Policy Research. In Spring, 1977, 
additional contributions were made to the Asian American 
Assembly from the City College Fund. 
The goals of the Asian American Assembly are threefold: 
First, the identification and recommendation for solutions to the 
major problems confronting Asian Americans. Second, research 
and publications by national panels appointed by the Assembly to 
generate a permanent body of information that may be useful as 
resource materials. Finally, the Assembly should provide a forum 
of scholars, community leaders and business executives on a 
regular basis - persons who can bring together both theoretical 
discipline and practical experience in the Asian American 
community. 
During 1976, the City College's Asian American Assembly in 
cooperation with the Department of Asian Studies has sponsored 
five seminars, two major workshops and one regional conference. 
Approximately one hundred specialists in education, social work 
and community leaders have participated in these workshops and 
conferences. Community organizations represented including the 
following: 
Chinatown Health and Service Center 
Chinatown Improvement Council 
Chinatown Manpower Project 
Chinatown Planning Council 
Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association 
Immigrant Social Services 
Project Ahead 
Two Bridges Neighborhood Council, etc. 
During 1977, the Asian American Assembly has convened a 
national conference on April 29-30 on five main subjects: (1) 
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Bilingual and Bicultural Education for Chinese Americans; (2) 
Teaching English to Chinese Speakers; (3) Social Services and 
Immigration Policies for Asian Americans; (4) Problems of 
Immigrant Youth; and (5) A Review of United States-China 
Relations. More than fifty papers will be published by the 
Assembly when funds become available. 
The Assembly is fortunate to have the participation of more 
than one hundred distinguished leaders from fourteen states and 
Washington, D.C. in business, education and community affairs 
to formulate the first National Advisory Council (1977-1978). 
Under the leadership of Mr. Henry Luce III and Judge William 
Marutani of Philadelphia, the National Advisory Council includes 
chairmen of several large corporations as well as owners of small 
businesses, university administrators as well as chair professors 
from thirty colleges and universities, and leaders from eighteen 
diversified community organizations such as, China Institute in 
America, Japan Society, as well as Jewish Community Council of 
New York. We are also grateful to Prof. Harry H. L. Kitano, 
UCLA, Prof. Jang H. Koo, University of Alaska at Fairbanks, and 
Prof. William T. Liu, Director of Asian American Mental Health 
Research Center at Chicago to serve as vice-chairmen and to 
guide the activities of the Assembly in the years ahead. 
The views expressed in the position papers on U.S.-China 
relations (abstracts) are those of the authors and not those of the 
Asian American Assembly or of the City College Fund or of the 
Field Foundation, which as educational institutions take no 
official position. 
N~w Yor~ City 
Winb.erg Chai 
Chairman 
THE MANCHUS AND THE YANKEES: 
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND HISTORIANS 
(Abstract) 
T. K. Tong* 
Having concluded a short review of the Sino-American 
relations during the Manchu period, this writer still wonders how 
much truth he has learned from the voluminous monographs 
which he has consulted. With the exception of a handful of recent 
titles by the younger academicians from the Institute of Modern 
History, Academia Sinica, in Taipei, few of the Chinese-language 
treatises covering this subject are worth serious exploration. 
Sentimentalism and lack of research facilities in old China have 
handicapped the Chinese scholarship in diplomatic studies. To 
professional bibliographers, therefore, it seems that exhaustive 
research on China's foreign relations of the early period has been 
a monopoly of English-speaking authors. The voluminous 
publications by the Harvard University Press alone certainly 
finds no parity in China on either side of the Taiwan Street. 
The chefs-d'oeuvre of the Western works on Chinese diplo-
macy, however, are by no means immune from bias. The most 
serious of all is their inexorable approach to specific historical 
events which has remained unchanged for ages. Linial writers 
were merely searching for additional facts and coining new terms 
to help prove the concepts that their forerunners had formulated 
generations back. 
From the middle of the last century, for instance, few 
conventional writers were willing to accept the fact that the 
principal cause of the Opium War was the narcotics trade. To 
them, the Opium War was only a logical consequence of the 
Manchu anticommercialism. Regardless of whatever commodities 
were being traded, say opium or rice, an armed conflict between 
China and the West was -inevitable. 
This Opium-War-not-for-opium approach has been continued 
by notable authors up to the present. But the latest development 
in China has made thoughtful readers skeptical of the orthodox 
wisdom. To compare Emperor Tao-kuang with Chairman Mao 
Tse-tung, no historian may be able to state that the former was 
more "anticommercial" than the latter. Yet when the latter closed 
all the treaty-ports to Western traders and imposed numerous 
* Professor of Asian Studies at The City College of New York. 
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"anticommercial" regulations on both the opium and the rice 
trade, no foreign gunboats ever showed up in his deserted harbors. 
It might be true, therefore, that the Opium War was not 
fought for opium as the American War of Independence was not 
fought for tea, but the principal cause of the Opium War was 
evidently not Tao-kuang's anticommercialism; rather it was his 
incapability to regulate his commerce by keeping the foreign 
gunboats away from the Chinese territorial waters. The Ameri-
cans were not involved in the early conflict with the Manchus. It 
was simply because the Yankee "Expansionists" were not yet able 
to cross the Pacific as they did successfully during the Spanish 
War. 
"Antiforeignism" was another term specifically coined by the 
conventional authors to characterize the Chinese foreign relations 
of the early period. Although the word has not been accepted by 
the etymologists, it appears in almost every English-language 
monograph relating to modem China. But the stories revealed by 
these authors indicated only that Chinese antiforeignism was in 
no way more serious than the foreign antiforeignism in China 
during the corresponding periods. John Hay's Open Door was in 
fact designed to combat the latter rather than the former. So were 
the policies formulated by Presidents Roosevelt and Taft prior to 
the outbreak of the First World War. Chinese antiforeignism, 
including the boycott against American goods at the beginning of 
this century, actually played a miniscule role in Sino-Western 
relations, if it was not a pure legend. 
The Boxer Rebellion, which was no more than a spontaneous 
anti-Christian mass movement, has been frequently cited by 
Western authors as an outstanding example of senseless antifor-
eignism in nineteenth century China. Here again, a recent 
religious tournament performed by the Rev. Sun Myung Moon and 
his Unification Church has rendered the conventional anti-Boxer 
argument a meaningless statement. If the American parents could 
find any justification today to "de-program" their youthful 
Moonies, their Chinese counterpart were certainly more justified 
to do the same in a Confucian society some hundred years ago. In 
fact, the painful dislocation that the young Moonies have caused 
to their parental society is in no way to compare with the damage 
that the Christian missions had done to the society of China. 
Moreover, few of the Western writers have ever attempted to 
compare the Chinese antiforeignism with the anti-Chinese 
movement in America during the same period. As the Manchu-
American relations have constituted a unique piece of history, the 
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two incidents were actually the two sides of one coin. The short-
lived Boxer Rebellion did not seem to deserve more attention than 
the Exclusionist Movement which has been totally neglected by 
nearly all eminent diplomatic historians on this side of the 
Pacific. Even for those who tend to treat the anti-Chinese racism 
in America as an independent subject, they never hesitated to 
apply the conventional Opium-War-not-for-opium approach to 
their study of the "bitter strength." The Chinese-exclusion 
movement was not directed against the Chinese workers, as one 
recent writer has argued. It was provoked by the Chinese 
unadaptability to the American way of life. 
To read only the Western-language publications covering the 
Sino-American relations, therefore, one cannot but believe that for 
any wrong-doing on either side of the Pacific Ocean, only John 
Chinaman was to be blamed. Leading writers in America are 
rather firm in defending this century-old conclusion though some 
also began to question their inherited wisdom. To them it seems to 
be as true as the law of gravity, whereas untrained writers on the 
other side of the ocean could only present their arguments with 
some immatured research which are always coupled with 
unnecessary sentimentalism. As a matter of fact, neither side was 
immune from bigotry though masqueraded academicism is 
definitely more malicious to the search of truth. 
"It is better to know nothing than to know what ain't so," to 
quote a saying from Josh Billings. When the diplomats are 
talking about normalization of Sino-American diplomatic rela-
tions, would it be a good time for scholars on both sides to think of 
a normalization movement in academic circles? 

RELATIONS WITH THE 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(Abstracts) 
Richard H. Yang* 
The United States (US) is the first modern Republic of the 
West, and the Republic of China (ROC) the first republic of the 
East. Founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1912, the ROC has been a 
well established cultural identity and longstanding vital political 
entity for sixty-six years, not a political or cultural fiction as some 
critics would like us to believe. Relations between the US and ROC 
have gone through many crucial changes during the past six and 
a half decades (1912-1977), they have always remained friends 
and allies throughout war and peace. This is the China which has 
been recognized by the US since 1928. This recognition has its 
historical roots deeply seated in goodwill and mutual interests 
which had existed long before that date. Also, this is the China 
which now offers the only democratic alternative and cultural 
aspiration for millions of Chinese throughout the world. 
The roots of US-ROC relations have been seriously challenged 
and the survival of the ROC threatened by some who seek to place 
those relations and survival in serious jeopardy, ever since the 
Nixon Administration dramatically altered the course of United 
States policy toward China in 1972; now that policy is under 
critical review by the Carter Administration. 
The Carter Administration's advocacy of a moral principle in 
foreign affairs raises serious questions regarding the extent to 
which America practices segmented morality - taking a high 
moral tone with some countries, while making capricious 
exception for others? Inasmuch as the survival of the ROC is a 
matter of serious concern to most Chinese Americans, therefore, 
they have a legitimate interest to see whether the Carter 
Administration will live_ up to its own commitment to link 
preservation of human rights with foreign affairs, and whether 
the US is permissively allowing the Chinese Communists to have 
a free ride on the human rights-foreign affairs principle. Thus, 
this paper attempts to review the historic relations and analyze 
the policy options under the various American administrations. 
Emphasis is plated on the political, military, economic and 
cultural factors of questioning the wisdom of derecognition of the 
* Professor of Chinese Studies at Washington University (St. Louis). 
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Government of the ROC, and that of recognition of the Peking 
regime. 
I. US-ROC RELATIONS IN 1912-1927 
On October 18, 1911, eight days after the successful revolution 
of the Chinese Nationalists at Wuchang, Sun Yat-sen asked 
Secretary of State Knox for a private meeting, but failed. Knox 
also rejected American envoy Homer Lea's plea for America to be 
first to recognize Sun's government, shortly after Sun became the 
first President of Provisional Government at Nanking. Two 
months later, Charles Tenny unofficially approached Sun and 
maintained that the US desired to remain "neutrality throughout 
the present struggle in China," but the Wilson Administration, 
upon William J. Bryan's recommendation, chose to recognize the 
Government of Yuan Shih-kai in 1913, and the ensuing warlord 
governments in Peking after Yuan. Disappointed with foreign 
indifference and frustrated with the lack of unity at home, Sun 
was forced to seek support of the Soviet Union. In 1925, Sun died 
without seeing the fulfillment of his lifelong aspiration for a 
unified modern Chinese republic under democracy, independence 
and prosperity. Despite that he was a great democrat with a 
genuine appreciation for American democracy, Sun was unable in 
his lifetime to gain American support or recognition for his 
Provisional Government at Nanking in 1912 and his Revolution-
ary Government at Canton in 1917. 
On the international front, the US was preoccupied with 
European affairs, but had displayed a policy prejudicial to Japan 
over the Sino-Japanese disputes. The Wilson Administration 
declared the famous Fourteen Points on the one hand, but 
legitimatized the Japanese special interests in China by signing 
the Ishii-Lansing Agreement in 1917. Faced with Japan's 
insatiable ambition and growing military might, Secretary 
Hughes made a great effort at the Washington Conference to 
revive the moribund open door policy through the Nine-Power 
Treaty demanding Japan, along with other signatory powers, to 
respect the "sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and 
administrative integrity of China" by withdrawing the Japanese 
troops from Shantung. 
During the same period, the May Fourth Movement, the rise 
of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the KMT-CCP detente, the 
death of Sun Yat-sen, the KMT-CCP schism, May Thirtieth 
Incident, and the KMT's Northern Expedition Campaign had all 
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contributed to China's political awareness and determination to 
strive for national independence and international respectability. 
However, the US-ROC relations still remained relatively unimpor-
tant to the over-all foreign policy of the US. 
II. US-ROC RELATIONS IN 1928-1936 
During this period, relations between the two nations were 
generally improved but still somewhat shadowed by America's 
reluctance to challenge Japan's grand strategy on China. 
Following the KMT's successful Northern Expedition Campaign, 
the US signed a protocol in March 1928 and formally recognized 
the Nationalist Government of the ROC. 
In order to effectuate her grand strategy against China, 
Japan chose to defy the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1929) which 
outlawed war as an instrument of diplomacy, and launched an 
invasion against Manchuria on September 18, 1931. The infamy 
of the Mukden Incident aggravated US-Japan relations and 
became the prelude to the eight-year War of Resistance in 1937; 
and to Pearl Harbor in 1941. In response to the Chinese 
Government's appeal, Secretary Stimson declared the famous 
Non-recognition Doctrine which constitutes a long-standing and 
formidable challenge to the legality of international conquest by 
force. Meanwhile, the League of Nations approved the Lytton 
Report and passed an economic sanction against Japan. 
But Japan's reaction to Stimson's non-recognition doctrine 
was the installation of puppet Manchukuo with Henry Pu Yi as its 
emperor in 1932. In defiance to the League's Resolution, Japan 
withdrew from the League and continued to step up its military 
attack. In 1934, the Japanese Foreign Minister Koki Hirota 
proclaimed the Japanese "Monroe Doctrine" for East Asia. It was 
followed by another Amau Statement, arrogating to Japan "the 
entire burden of responsibility for the preservation of peace in the 
Far East as her 'divine mission.' " 
In facing the Japanese military conquest of China in the 
name of the so-called "Co-Prosperity Sphere," the United States 
was handicapped by domestic economic crisis and contained by 
its own powerful opposition of the isolationists through a series of 
Neutrality Acts. Moreover, Hull's own stress on "Europe first" in 
foreign policy had in fact delayed US confrontation with Japan in 
the Far East. President Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech had no 
teeth, and the American Government's moral outrage was no 
deterrent. Japan's rampant aggression went unchallenged. In the 
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meantime, the Chinese Government worked hard for consolidat-
ing its political strength at home and endeavored to abolish all of 
the unequal treaties throughout the strenuous decade. In July, the 
US was first among the foreign powers to sign a new Sino-
American Tariff Treaty abrogating America's special privilege in 
the management of customs administration of China. 
III. US-ROC RELATIONS IN 1937-1945 
The Sino-American relations in 1928-1936 was impaired by a 
series of US impotent and redundant proclamation of moralistic 
platitude. It was equally true during the first four years of China's 
eight-year War of Resistance 1937-1945 that the United States 
Government would provide little material help except for express-
ing its sincere sympathy for China's predicament and war 
sufferings. It was the Russians who provided China's sorely 
needed war supplies in the beginning of the war, while American 
merchants still sold shiploads of steel scrap to the Japanese 
aggressors. 
In summary, during the first four years of China's resistance, 
her perserverance had won a moral and diplomatic victory and the 
Chinese Government of the ROC under the leadership of Chiang 
Kai-shek refused to negotiate the Japanese peace overtures. 
Because of China's refusal to surrender, Japan was forced into an 
expensive but hopeless war of attrition. This singular contribution 
of the ROC to the entire war effort among its allies should neither 
be conveniently forgotten nor expediently obliterated. It was very 
crucial, however, for the Government of the ROC to secure the US 
moral support during the initial phase of China's struggle and the 
US Government did exactly just that. 
As the war entered 1941, Japan expanded its invasion in Indo-
China and the Southeast Asia, the crisis quickened. In April1941, 
the US Government rejected the so-called "World Peace Plan" 
proposed by Japan calling for the demilitarization British and 
American naval forces in the Pacific, US withdrawal to Hawaii as 
well as inclusion of Australia and New Zealand into the Co-
Prosperity Sphere. Instead, the US Government offered Japan a 
modus vivendi, provided that Japan halted her further advances 
in Indo-China, and recognized the National Government of the 
ROC at Chungking. But the Japanese Imperial Conference had 
already made the decision on September 6 to prepare for war 
against the United States. 
In the wake of the Pearl Harbour attack on December 7, 1941, 
China and the United States formally declared war on Japan. The 
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war against Japan was no longer China's sole burden. During the 
second four-year war phase, the following aspects merit special 
attention: (1) China's role in the China-Burma-India Theatre was 
compromised under the Anglo-American pursuit of a "Europe first 
and Asia second" war strategy. China was a full partner in the 
war, but a secondary ally in the alliance. The America's 
overriding aim in the Pacific War Theatre was to "keep China in 
the war, and so to strengthen her that she might exact a 
constantly growing price from the Japanese invader." In the end, 
China did play a fair share in both fighting the war and defeating 
the Japanese. It must be remembered that it was under the 
government of the ROC that China stood up and will never be 
bullied again! (2) the tragic episode of Stilwell had acerbated and 
marred US-ROC relations for many years. According to John 
Davis, "He (Stilwell) was removed because Chiang could not 
accept a foreigner taking command of all Chinese forces. It was 
inevitable and an entirely unrealistic concept." To this date, the 
ROC Government is still paying a terrible price for the bitter 
lesson; (3) the US had enjoyed the full advantages of extra territor· 
iality and related rights in China for more than four decades 
(1901-1943). It was the Chinese people and the government who 
had earned respect and recognition among nations for their war 
efforts through a protracted War of Resistance. In demonstrating 
the US goodwill to "correct an historic mistake" and to show 
additional proof that the US wanted China not only as a "partner 
in waging war" but also as a "partner of peace," the US signed a 
treaty in relinquishing US extraterritoriality in 1943; (4) the US 
recognized that to keep the ROC in the war was indispensable to 
ultimate allied victory, and that it was logical for the US to build 
up China's world status early so that China would be able to play 
an important world role to fill the power gap left by Japan during 
the post-war period so as to maintain the political stability in the 
Pacific region vis-a-vis the rising influence in Asia. As a result, 
China was invited to sign the Declaration of Four Nations on 
General Security in 1943 and to participate in the Cairo 
Conference in the same year. Despite those efforts to help China 
to gain great power status, paradoxically, the United States 
unwittingly compromised her Samaritan diplomacy by concluding 
a secret agreement with the Russians at Yalta on February 11, 
1945, and deliberately kept China uninformed of it for several 
months. 
The ignominious Yalta Agreement is a classical example of 
an act by the US Government, irrespective of its rhetoric 
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plausibility of moralistic diplomacy, chose to defend its own 
national interest, i.e., to invite the Russians to enter the war 
against Japan, to shorten the war and save American lives, at the 
expense of China. It is paradoxical for the US to help China to 
drive out one aggressor on the one hand, but force China to accept 
another aggressor on the other hand. The Yalta Agreement had 
deprived the ROC's real opportunity of replacing Japan as a 
major stabilizing power in the Far East, because it led to the 
Communist take-over of China. Instead of rectifying the historic 
blunder, the US Government is now going to legitimatize the 
communist regime at the expense of the ROC under a specious 
pretext and wishful logic that the Peking-Moscow schism proved 
communism to be no longer monolithic and that pragmatism must 
take precedence of all policy considerations. In retrospect, the self-
serving and casuistic contention of US infallibility in the Yalta 
tragedy in connection with US-ROC relations must be challenged. 
IV. US-ROC RELATIONS 1946-1950 
For more than sixty years since 1895, China has been 
confronted with the dual threat of Russian and Japanese 
aggression in rotation. Mter the Japanese surrender in 1945, a 
new Russian aggression intensified. Although the ROC had 
emerged from the victory a nominal great power, in fact she had 
been plagued by civil strifes, morbid bureaucracy, economic crises, 
social disorder, political disunity and the Communist rebellion. 
Under the circumstances, the ROC Government was unable to 
devote itself to the post-war reconstruction. The Chinese Commu-
nists expanded their forces during the war and after, and were 
ready to challenge the Government by force; they were portrayed 
by many Americans as agrarian reformers and a new dynamic 
democratic force of a new China to be reckoned with. The KMT-
CCP struggle was viewed as civil war, not as part of Stalin's 
grand strategy of contrived conquest of China. 
Rational dialogues on the US policy toward China are rare. 
Apprehension, acrimony and sometimes hostility existing among 
many American and Chinese leaders had turned the US-ROC 
relations into the darkest era in 1946-1949. Many US leaders 
legislated their own pathological predilections and substituted it 
for national policy in the name of objective national interests. The 
complexity and intricacy of the eventful post-war US-ROC 
relations almost defy any sensible simplification in a short time. I 
can only use the following important cases to summarize the 
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development of US-ROC relations during this landmark phase of 
Chinese modern history. 
(1) The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 upon the 
US-ROC Relations: The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 which was 
the direct result of the Yalta Agreement imposed on the ROC, has 
brutalized China's national honor for years. As a college student 
who witnessed the grassroot indignation toward the Yalta 
Agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty, I took part in many 
massive student demonstration protesting the Soviet aggression 
and the US connivance. To this day, regardless of their political 
persuasions, most Chinese would agree that the Yalta tragedy did 
put the credibility of American Samaritan Diplomacy in serious 
jeopardy. No thinking Chinese of my generation would seriously 
consider that the United States can be a reliable or potentially 
credible ally at a time of crisis. Credibility gap resulted from the 
Yalta Infamy of the United States has become a big boulder 
standing in the way of improving the US-ROC relations for years 
to come. 
(2) The Debacle of the Marshall Mission: Immediately after 
the war ended in 1945, the ROC was faced with two options of 
regrettable necessities, either securing the US cooperation or the 
Russian aid, to go about her post-war reconstruction. Each of such 
options would potentially impair and compromise China's self-
reliance effort to a certain degree. But, in order to minimize the 
latent trauma inflicted upon China by either of these options, the 
ROC chose to cooperate with the US. At the outset, the Marshall 
was beset with insoluble complexity of entangled political, 
military and economic problems. On December 15, 1945, in the 
midst of a deepening Chinese crisis and intensifying military 
hostilities, President issued a China policy statement calling for a 
"strong, united, and democratic China" as of utmost importance 
to world peace, so that China would be able to discharge 
responsibilities for post-war domestic reconstruction as well as for 
maintaining international stability and world peace. General 
Marshall was instructed by the President "to bring to bear the 
influence of the US to the end that unification of China by 
peaceful and democratic methods." After thirteen months of futile 
effort and bitter frustration, Marshall failed his mission and 
resigned. In facing the expanded Communist military attack, the 
United States, now with Marshall as the new Secretary of State, 
would preside over a new disengaged policy toward the belea-
guered Government of the ROC. 
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(3) Segmented Bipartisan Foreign Policy toward Chi-
na: The China crisis culminated in the 80th Congress when a 
divided government between a Republican-controlled Congress 
and a Democratic-occupied White House carried on its foreign 
policy toward China along the segmented bipartisanship. Senator 
Arthur H. Vandenberg, architect of the segmented bipartisan 
foreign policy, strongly advocated China's freedom of choice to 
remain as a democratic republic, and openly disassociated from 
the Administration's China policy on coalition government, but 
did not challenge the Administration's hands-off policy toward 
China and agreed to exclude the US policy China from his 
bipartisanship in foreign affairs. Thus, Vandenberg's segmented 
bipartisanship toward China became a tragic policy by default. 
His full bipartisan commitment to support the Marshall Plan may 
have saved Western Europe from a Soviet take-over, but his 
segmented bipartisan foreign policy certainly did invalidate the 
US Samaritan diplomacy of preventing the Communist take-over 
of China. At the critical moment of fighting for its survival in 
1949, the ROC Government was dealt with several fatal blows. 
The most important is the release of the White Paper on US Policy 
toward China. The loss of China was attributed by the Americans 
to the ROC's lacking of "will to resist." 
As things stood prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the 
Truman Administration excluded Taiwan and Korea from the 
first line of US defense in the Western Pacific. Secretary Dean 
Acheson reaffirmed the US hand-off China policy and warned the 
new Asian nations that they must have the "will to fight 
communism" themselves before the US could offer them economic 
aid and advice. Ironically, in 1977, twenty-eight years after the 
China debacle, the ROC is now again faced with perhaps the most 
critical challenge and test of the US commitment to the Sino-
American Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. At this time, if the 
Carter Administration chooses to abandon the ROC through 
derecognition, the ROC should not be blamed for lacking of the 
"will to fight for its own survival". No amount of casuistic 
paralogism and specious rationalization will change the fact that 
the Carter Administration simply did forsake the ROC for the 
sake of playing the power politics of using Peking against Moscow 
at the expense of the ROC. 
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(1) The Truman Administration: Two days after the 
outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman altered his hands-
off China policy dramatically by ordering the Seventh Fleet to 
patrol the Taiwan Straits in order to prevent the Chinese 
Communists from attacking Taiwan. The Korean War not only 
altered the US policy in Asia in general, but also turned a new leaf 
on US-ROC relations for the next two decades. For the first time, 
the US containment policy began to apply in restraining the 
Chinese Communists. By dismissing General MacArthur, the US 
warned the ROC that they should not entertain any false hope of 
expecting the US to help them to regain the Chinese mainland via 
the Korean War. Meantime, the US gradually resumed limited 
military and economic aids afterward. The Truman Administra-
tion was committed to support the ROC seat at the United 
Nations and backed the ROC's complaint in the UN against 
Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists and the Russians' violation 
of the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance. 
(2) The Eisenhower Administration: The Eisenhower Ad-
ministration with John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State 
marked considerable changes in the US-ROC relations: A. 
appointment of a new U.S. ambassador to the ROC; B. strong 
defense of the ROC against the Chinese Communists attack on 
Taiwan; C. signing of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty 
in 1954 as sign of considering the ROC as a crucial part of the US 
global collective security defense chain; D. support of the ROC's 
UN seat and reaffirmation of non-recognition of the Chinese 
Communist regime in Peking; E. nascent concept of Two-China 
policy as advanced by the Colon Report in November 1959 and the 
Rockefeller Panel Report in 1960, with indication that the 
Eisenhower Administration would readjust its present policies if 
the situation "in the Far East were so to change in its basic 
elements as to call for a radically different evaluation of the threat 
Chinese Communist policies pose to the US;" F. initiation of the 
Washington-Peking bilateral talk: the focal point of such talks 
was to ascertain the principle of renouncement of force in settling 
Peking-Taipei dispute. In summary, the pattern of US-ROC 
relations based on the de facto Two-China Policy was sanctioned 
by the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. The US would not tolerate 
military attacks by either the ROC or the Chinese Communists 
against each other. 
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(3) The Kennedy Administration: At first, the Kennedy 
Administration vowed to switch from the Dulles' brinkmanship of 
massive retaliation in foreign policy to the New Frontier policy of 
flexible response and advocated a break in the impasse of the US-
ROC policy. Despite its assurances of "defending Formosa 
whatever the risk, and whatever the costs," the Administration 
kept its options open should the Chinese Communists modify their 
policies. Clearly, the nomalization between Washington and 
Peking was no longer blocked by the opposition of the ROC, but 
rather by the increasing Communist belligerent attitude. During 
the short period of the Kennedy Administration, one still can 
identify some of the positive developments in US-ROC relations: 
A. re-emphasis on the strategic importance of Taiwan as crucial to 
US security in the Western Pacific; B. considering the Chinese 
representation question in the UN as "important substantive 
question;" C. US continued support for the defense of the offshore 
islands held by the ROC; D. in view of the Peking-Moscow schism, 
the Kennedy Administration set another important pattern in 
dealing with the Chinese Communists, i.e., the Chinese Commu-
nists must change and reciprocate. The change of US policy 
toward Peking was contingent upon such a reciprocal change by 
the Peking regime. But Peking did little to reciprocate. Besides, 
the Chinese Communists' cartoon caricature of Kennedy as "ken-
ni-ti" ("bite muddy ground", derogatory transliteration of 
Kennedy's name in Chinese), and their uncharacteristic jubilation 
over the Kennedy's assassination certainly did not win the Peking 
regime many friends. 
(4) The Johnson Administration: President Johnson deve-
loped a two-track policy toward the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC 
on the mainland. As for the former, his administration was to 
follow the principles laid down by previous administrations after 
1949, namely, a continued recognition of the ROC, support of the 
ROC seat at the UN, and a firm commitment to the US-ROC 
Mutual Defense Treaty obligations. On the other hand, a new 
policy toward Peking was formulated, i.e., "containment without 
isolation" and a "new open door policy." In the historical sense, 
President Johnson was the last American President to defend the 
containment policy, and Dean Rusk the last Secretary of State to 
execute that policy. Assistant Secretary Roger Hilsman, Jr. 
signaled a basic change in the Johnson Administration's policy 
toward Peking by telling the Commonwealth Club of San 
Francisco: "US defense of Formosa is a matter of basic principle," 
and "no basic improvement in US-Chinese relations is possible 
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until Communist China accepts that fact." However, Hilsman 
declared officially a Two-China policy by saying: "The US is 
determined to keep the door open to the possibility of change in 
Communist China and will not slam it shut against any 
developments which might advance our national good, serve the 
free world, and benefit the people of China." Furthermore, Dean 
Rusk outlined new policy guidelines in dealing with Peking: First, 
to assure Peking publicly and candidly that the US did not intend 
to attack mainland China; second, not to assume the existence of 
"unending and inevitable state of hostility" between Washington 
and Peking; third, to gradually expand the categories of American 
travel, cultural exchanges, trade, mail and other communications; 
fourth, to hold diplomatic discussions with Peking on the critical 
problems of disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear wea-
pons. Obviously, the Johnson Administration was impressed with 
the gains in nuclear weaponry by Peking in the midst of truculant 
Cultural Revolution and increasingly acrimonious Peking-Moscow 
schism. It was difficult indeed for the ROC and a good portion of 
the American people to appreciate the logic and moral justifica-
tion for considering a Two-China policy. Logic and morality 
aside, ally or no ally, the Johnson Administration stood ready in 
1969 to accommodate and reciprocate whatever and whenever 
Peking was willing to cooperate. Unfortunately, treaty or no 
treaty obligation, the ROC was helplessly and anxiously kept 
waiting on the sideline. 
(5) The Nixon-Ford Administrations: The ROC Govern-
ment was keenly aware of the full significance of the gradual 
change in US policy, but took comfort in assuming that if the 
dramatic change of policy did not take place under Democratic 
Administrations, it will be unlikely that the Republican Adminis-
tration will make any radical change. But the ROC's optimistic 
assumption turned out to be premature and complacent when 
Nixon made the historic and dramatic visit to Peking in 1972. The 
Nixon trip sent a shock wave throughout the world and had a 
devastating impact upon the people and government of the ROC. 
In fact, as early as October 1967, Nixon wrote in Foreign Affairs 
calling for a flexible policy toward Peking. In his first State of the 
Union Message, President Nixon advocated "an era of negotia-
tion" in substitution for "an era of confrontation." Between 1969 
and 1971, Nixon made several overtures to Peking through 
various channels. Trade and travel restrictions were eased, the 
Nixon Doctrine principally aiming at Peking was proclaimed. The 
leaders of the ROC visited the US in 1970 urging the Nixon 
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Administration not to put its Two-China policy into immediate 
effect. But no matter, the Nixon Administration went ahead with 
its Two-China policy. In a banquet to honor the visiting 
Romanian Chief of State, Nixon referred for the first time to the 
"People's Republic of China," and stated in September, 1970 "If 
there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China." In 
December, Nixon told the press conference: "Looking long toward 
the future we must have some communications and eventually 
relations with Communist China." The carefully orchestrated 
"ping-pong diplomacy" in 1971 was a prelude to the happenings of 
a chain of events. Following the secret talk between Henry 
Kissinger and Chou En-lai in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971, 
President Nixon announced on July 15 that he had accepted the 
Chinese Communists' invitation for a visit to Peking. US-ROC 
relations strained considerably after the Nixon announcement. 
On August 2, 1971, Secretary Rogers officially endorsed a dual 
Chinese representation at the UN. On October 25, 1971, the China 
question was voted on in the General Assembly, Henry Kissin-
ger's ostenatious presence in Peking sent a clear message to the 
world. The ROC had no choice but protected its national honor by 
walking out of the UN. On February 27, 1972, the Nixon-Chou 
Shanghai Communique was issued after Nixon's visit came to an 
end. The Communique covered a wide range of bilateral question. 
The focal point still rested on the Taiwan question. Each side 
reaffirmed its respective position on Taiwan. The US acknowl-
edged all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits maintain 
there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Peking 
insisted that Taiwan is a province of China and that settlement of 
Taiwan question is a matter of China's internal affair. The US 
stated that it was merely concerned with a peaceful settlement of 
the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves, and that its 
ultimate objective US withdrawal and progressive reduction of 
military installation on Taiwan as the tension in the area 
diminished. Thus, the objective of normalization was agreed upon, 
but definite schedule for effectuation was not set. In 1973, 
Washington and Peking had exchanged Liaison Offices. By 
setting a diplomatic and historic precedent in stationing one legal 
embassy at Taipei, the ROC, and a de facto mission in Peking, the 
US officially instituted a formula of its own, quite different from 
the German formula or Japanese model. Despite all official 
assurances that nothing was done "at the expense of the old 
friends," the US was very careful not to offend Peking, President 
Nixon and Kissinger were inaccessible to the ROC diplomats. 
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In the wake of the Nixon Administration's somersault policy 
on China, a diplomatic avalanche followed. More than 60 nations 
recognized the Government of the ROC before Nixon's trip, but 
that figure has steadily come down to reach 23 in 1977. But the 
ROC took the Nixon shock and diplomatic setbacks in a sober 
stride. She quietly and effectively withstood the diplomatic 
isolation, international boycott and economic hardship from 1972 
to 1975. 
During the Ford Administration, no substantive progress was 
made toward normalization after Ford's trip to Peking in 1975. 
The Administration ruefully discovered that Teng who held talks 
with Ford, was again disgraced shortly after Chou En-lai died in 
January 1976. Mao's invitation of Nixon to visit with him after 
Nixon's resignation from the Presidency certainly did not do 
either one any good, particularly during an election year in 1976. 
After Mao died in September 1976, a new political power struggle 
erupted. On the contrary, when the ROC lost its leader, Chiang 
Kai-shek in April 1975, there was no leadership crisis but a 
peaceful and institutional transition of power. Being perplexed 
and vexed with the capricious power struggles on the mainland, 
the Ford Administration quickly realized that indiscreetness in 
dealing with Peking in the midst of political turmoil and 
leadership instability will neither serve the best interests of the 
United States, nor save the US from policy embarrassment later 
on. As a result, except for following the Nixon-Kissinger basic 
policy on China, President Ford's policy was a holding action and 
waited for an election victory to effectuate whatever the new 
policy as planned. But, Ford lost the election as well as an 
opportunity to implement his new policy toward China. 
V. RE-EXAMINATION OF THE CHINA POLICY OPTIONS UNDER 
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, 1977 
As of April 30, 1977, President Carter has been in office less 
than four months. The President is primarily occupied with 
domestic issues and other key foreign problems concerning the 
SALT II talks with the Soviet Union, and the Middle East crisis. 
Despite ·the President's initial statement on the China question 
that the US would continue to proceed with the normalization on 
the basis of the Shanghai Communique and that the security of 
the ROC on Taiwan must be guaranteed, nevertheless, the whole 
question requires more time for careful review and re-evaluation. 
Ever since President Carter injected the human rights issue into 
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the foreign policy of his Administration, normalization with 
Peking could be complicated by increasing criticism of the 
President's subtle silence on the brutal violation of the Chinese 
people's human rights under the Chinese Communist slavocracy, 
or by Peking's own insistence on no written pledge of non-
belligerency toward settlement of the Taiwan question. With 
regard to the future of US-ROC relations, suggestions abound but 
options are limited. For example: 1. continued support for the 
ROC: Taiwan is strategically vital to the US defense perimeter in 
the Western Pacific. Those who disputed Taiwan's strategic 
importance to the US security in the Far East, are either 
understating their political perception or over-exaggerating their 
prejudicial preference; 2. derecognition of the ROC and recogni-
tion of Peking as the sole legitimate government of China: By 
doing so, the US has to give in to Peking's three preconditions, 
severance of U.S. diplomatic relations with the ROC, abrogation 
of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty and the removal of US troops 
and bases from the ROC. The difficulty with this option is that the 
US itself is scuttling her written pledge to the ROC, how can the 
US expect the shrewd Chinese Communists to make a new pledge 
in writing and to keep it in deed? Besides, it is utterly unfair and 
immoral for the US to betray its own commitment to individual 
liberty and democratic value by acting as a political mortician for 
the Chinese Communists' liberation of Taiwan by proxy? 3. Open-
end policy: This is also called Two-China policy. Like others, it 
carries with it certain deficiencies. But at least, the US still holds 
on to its own initiative and independent freedom of policy making 
option. Recently, suggestions were made in some quarters that a 
possible military cooperation between Peking and Washington 
should be probed further. Despite the Peking-Moscow schism, 
neither Peking nor Moscow chose to abrogate the Sino-Russo 
Mutual Defense Treaty of 1950, why should American military aid 
become the Chinese Communists' welfare at the expense of its 
allies? And why should the ROC be put in double jeopardy? 
In the process of policy evaluation, it is important to take the 
following three aspects into considerations: First, Peking has set 
the preemptive and non-negotiable conditions for normalization 
between Washington and Peking. In seeking to place their 
negotiating opponents on the defensive from the outset, the 
Chinese Communists have always insisted that their negotiation 
agenda be considered as a set of conclusions; second, US-Peking 
negotiations for normalization are not merely bilateral undertak-
ings, the entire security and peace in the East Asia region is 
U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS 23 
involved. Above all, it is the creditability of the United States as 
treaty partner under challenge; third, the people and the 
government of the ROC have rejuvenated in the past three 
decades since 1949. They have done nothing at all to compel the 
United States to abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty and to 
derecognize them. If the Carter Administration chooses to accept 
the Chinese Communists' preconditions as the price for normali-
zation for the sheer sake of normalization with Peking, then the 
US Government can no longer disavow responsibility for 
abandoning the people and the government of the ROC. It is 
unconscionable for the United States to legitimatize the Chinese 
Communists' birth right to claim that all Chinese must live under 
the Communist system against their volition. The United States 
has no moral obligation to "liberate the ROC" and destroy the 
sixteen million people's freedom of existence for Peking by proxy. 
The Carter Administration's China policy must not be arbitrary, 
inhumane or Machiavellian. It must not be assumed that the ROC 
will disappear after derecognition and that the US has no 
responsibility for destabilizing the security and power equilibrium 
in the Pacific region. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
US-ROC relations have been long and good. As a loyal and 
self-reliant ally in war and in peace, the ROC has proved its 
political integrity, economic viability, cultural sublimity and its 
will of survival to its own people and to the world. It was the 
United States which has insisted on that China must be 
democratic. After three decades of nation building effort, the ROC 
on Taiwan has become a huge reservoir of unusual talents and 
human resources. It has become the seed plant of China's hope for 
democracy, and the symbol of cultural mecca of millions of 
overseas Chinese throughout the world. The ROC is the most 
acknowledged member of international community who is 
peaceful, constructive and capable of receiving and sharing much 
scientific and cultural knowledge among nations. 
During the 200 years of US history, no single mutual defense 
treaty has been unilaterally or arbitrarily nullified for the sake of 
the adversary who has long sought to destroy the very signatory 
party of such mutual defense pact purported to protect. The people 
and government of the ROC have stated repeatedly that they are 
grateful to the people and government of the United States for 
their generous support given to them, but the US must exercise no 
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diplomatic moral relativism or selective human rights standards. 
It is about time for the US to treat the ROC as her own ally 
instead of treating her as "helpless pawns" in the world of 
Machiavellian power politics. The US must stop her patronizing 
attitude and condescending arrogance toward her ally, the ROC. 
No amount of casuistic rhetorics and pragmatic palliatives will 
prove that the China question can be effectively and realistically 
resolved by the US' unilateral concession and permissive 
condonation toward Peking. The United States may not adopt an 
anti-communist policy, but the Carter Administration should 
never adopt a pro-communist policy by sacrificing the legitimate 
freedom of survival of her ally. No secret deals should be made to 
Peking at the expense of the ROC. Besides, during the period of 
detente, the President's war powers have been considerably 
weakened by the passage of the War Powers Act of 1973 and the 
National Emergencies Act of 1976. I submit that the American 
Presidency cannot afford to be further constrained by the 
abrogation of the most trust-worthy US-ROC Mutual Defense 
Treaty of 1954, should the Chinese Communists make a feigned 
non-belligerent pledge as an inducement for US recognition, and 
then resort to military attack on the ROC. 
RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(Abstract) 
Y. C. CHANG* 
Since Richard Nixon reopened the door to China in 1972, there 
has been a great deal of expectation regarding the improvement of 
relations with the PRC. Yet, in the public discussion of the issue's 
pros and cons, both its proponents and opponents have assumed 
cavalier, parochial attitudes, despite the gravity of the matter. As 
a result, complex questions have been oversimplified to the point 
of distortion, and casual impressions given as irrefutable facts. To 
clarify some of the confusion now permeating official and 
academic circles, as well as the general public, it is essential to 
scrutinize some of the crucial misconceptions. 
MEANING OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE 
The Shanghai Communique is invariably cited in any 
discussion on Sino-American rapprochement, yet "so many people 
talk about it without reading it." Some China scholars advocate 
normalization because they think it is "promised" in the 
Shanghai Communique, when in fact, only the hope that "new 
prospects" would be opened up was expressed. Actually, the 
communique is a statement of disagreements- all relating to the 
Republic of China. The United States declared that it 
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan 
Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is 
part of China. The United States Government does not 
challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful 
settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese 
themselves. 
The Chinese Communists reaffirmed: 
The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the 
normalization of relations between China and the United 
States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is 
the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of 
China which has long been returned to the motherland; the 
liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no 
other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces 
and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. 
* Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Delaware. 
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Furthermore, proponents of normalization have even less 
reason for regarding the Shanghai Communique as a sacrosanct 
agreement. The State Department has repeatedly denied its legal 
as well as moral binding force upon either the Ford or subsequent 
administrations. Walter McConaughy put it aptly that "as a rule," 
a communique "is just a bland document consisting of platitudes 
and hardly remembered even by the signers or the drafters two 
days afterwards." 
NORMALIZATION AS A MEANS OF INFLUENCING CHINESE 
INTERNAL POLITICS 
A CIA analyst, among others, has urged normalization in 
order to influence the internal politics of China by strengthening 
the position of one factional group over another. He fails to realize 
that the United States has little reliable data about foreign policy 
cleavages among Chinese leaders to "play upon their differences." 
Communist Chinese sources have amply demonstrated that their 
leaders may differ on tactics to accomplish the goal of Sino-
American detente, but not on the goal itself, which, if realized, 
would pay off handsomely. The Nationalist government would be 
dealt a mortal blow, its alliance with the United States broken, 
and the United States could be exploited as a shield against the 
Soviet Union. The Chinese leadership, regardless of which faction 
dominates, will not easily give up such a grand strategy as long 
as there is a reasonable hope of success. 
NORMALIZATION TO PREVENT A SINO-SOVIET RE-ALLIANCE 
The prediction that Peking, after the death of Mao, would 
again lean toward the Soviet Union has so far been proven 
groundless. A careful study of the origins of the Sino-Soviet 
dispute shows that the improvement of relations between the two 
countries, even if possible, would be "limited" at best, since what 
has undermined their relationship is more than a personality 
clash between Mao and Soviet leaders, or their ideological 
differences regarding the correct interpretation of Marxism-
Leninism. Rather, it is the deep-rooted, complicated boundary 
controversy. On territorial questions, the Soviet Union has stood 
adamant and inflexible, not only with the People's Republic, but 
also with Japan on negotiations concerning the Kuriles. Until a 
compromise requiring substantial concessions by both can be 
reached, any chance for a genuine rapprochement between Peking 
and Moscow seems slim indeed. 
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Peking, however, has a more valid reason to worry about the 
American pursuit of detente with the Soviet Union. It has openly 
complained that the United States does not comprehend the true 
nature of the "new czars," and on occasion has provocatively 
intimated that the United States is no longer a superpower worthy 
of contention. A major reason for inviting James Schlesinger to 
the PRC, during which he was taken on an unprecedented tour of 
the regions bordering the Soviet Union, was undoubtedly the 
desire of the PRC to show support for his tough policies towards 
Moscow. The Chinese Communists are also not totally unaware of 
the fact that the United States can and may use Peking as one 
form of "leverage"56 over the Soviet Union, and Peking is jittery 
about such a sellout. Under these circumstances, the practicality 
of the United States in pursuing policies of detente simultaneously 
with two antagonists is questionable, no matter how attractive the 
objective may be in the abstract. In the short run, the United 
States may be able to play one against the other, but in the long 
run, it must make a choice, because in pleasing one, the United 
States will inevitably offend the other. 
NORMALIZATION AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
In the Shanghai Communique, the United States "reaffirms 
its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the 
Chinese themselves," but such an outcome seems very unlikely. 
For the People's Republic, Taiwan is a question of principle on 
which, like similar problems with India and the Soviet Union, 
they cannot compromise. They have never ceased to state publicly 
that "we shall liberate Taiwan, by force if necessary." For the 
Nationalists, any talk about "reunification" with the mainland 
·would invite internal rebellion among the 16.6 million 
inhabitants, mainlanders and Taiwanese alike, who 
overwhelmingly oppose such a move on understandable grounds 
such as, among others, the relative prosperity and freedom in 
comparison with the prevailing conditions on the mainland. 
Some advocates of Sino-American rapprochement have urged 
normalization before "peaceful settlement," which would entail 
derecognition of the Republic of China and annulment of the 
Mutual Defense Treaty. They fail to take into account some ofthe 
desperate measures to which Taiwan might resort for the sake of 
self-preservation. First, the ROC, denied American protection, 
must explore every avenue to strengthen its defense, including the 
possibility of "going nuclear." Having been excluded from the 
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International Atomic Energy Agency membership in 1972, the 
ROC has, nevertheless, observed the provisions of the non-
proliferation treaty, and denied any intention to develop nuclear 
weapons, but whether or not the Republic of China or South Korea 
will develop nuclear weapons, as one commentator observed, 
will, to a large extent, depend on American actions since they 
are dependent on U.S. security guarantees. If trust in the U.S. 
security guarantee erodes, the pressure to acquire nuclear 
weapons is likely to increase. 
Second, the ROC may be forced to seek rapprochement with 
the Soviet Union. Several sources have already revealed that in 
1973, the Soviet Union sent Victor Louis to Taiwan to negotiate 
the lease of naval facilities in the Pescadores, but he was flatly 
refused by Chiang Kai-shek. Soviet interest in naval bases in the 
China Sea extends as far back as 1958, when Khrushchev first 
approached Mao Tse-tung about the possibility of leasing Chinese 
ports and was embarrassingly rebuffed. Given Russia's present 
policy of expansion into the Indian Ocean, Taiwan's air and 
naval bases presently occupied by the Americans are extremely 
attractive indeed. 
U.S. CREDIBILITY AS AN ALLY 
To derecognize the Republic of China and annul the Mutual 
Defense Treaty would immediately jeopardize American 
credibility as an ally. For decades, the French have wondered if 
the United States would risk the destruction of New York in order 
to save Paris and, after the Vietnam fiasco, many members of 
NATO have begun to harbor similar doubts. In Asia, the "Nixon 
shock" prompted the Japanese to recognize the PRC hurriedly, 
and other countries, including previously staunch anti-
Communist governments, quickly followed suit as soon as they 
saw the handwriting on the wall. Even South Korea has 
conducted secret negotiations with Peking in Hong Kong, for no 
one wants to be left holding the bag. 
In the immediate future, the United States needs the 
cooperation and support of Japan in maintaining order and 
stability in the Pacific region. American withdrawal from 
Vietnam has already "raised serious doubts in Japan ... as to 
the credibility of the American guarantee," and the Japanese 
have been alarmed by "the occasional refusal of Congress in 
recent years to appropriate adequate funds to back up American 
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commitments abroad." Ohira, the pro-Peking foreign minister 
who was instrumental in Japan's hasty recognition of the 
People's Republic, and other Japanese leaders candidly told 
Senator Mike Mansfield in July 1976 that Japan regretted rushing 
into recognition, that Japan's economic and cultural ties with the 
ROC, after the former's recognition of Peking, were mainly 
possible because of the American defense guarantee of Taiwan, 
and finally, that the United States should move cautiously in 
normalizing relations. If America ignores this advice, Fakuda, the 
present premier whose pro-Taiwan sympathies are well known, 
may be deeply annoyed. What the Japanese would do if they no 
longer trusted the American guarantee is anybody's guess: They 
would certainly strengthen their offensive as well as defensive 
military capability; they might develop closer relations with the 
Soviet Union, which they have hesitated to offend, as seen by 
their refusal to sign the Sino-Japanese friendship treaty because 
of its "anti-hegemony" clause; or they might even acquire nuclear 
weapons. The United States, and particularly the People's 
Republic, would not like to see these things happen. 
The United States one day might also need the support of 
other Asian countries in dealing with the PRC - a possibility, 
however remote, that no pragmatist should completely rule out, 
and Americans might find few willing to undertake the risk of 
offending Peking. The United States has acted like a big brother 
in the past, willing and able to persuade, cajole, and pressure 
Asian countries to forego the pursuit of their national interests for 
the benefit of all. Without ~mch mediation, Asia could easily 
become a powder keg, with far-reaching consequences. When 
American dominance in Asia is undermined, so is the stability of 
Asia. 
INTERNATIONAL MORALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
In many parts ofthe world, the United States is respected and 
admired no less for its . moral commitment to high idealistic 
aspirations - "national self-determination," fair play, and 
decency in the relations among countries - than for its military 
and economic might. In derecognizing the Republic of China and 
annulling the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States will be 
hard put to find a moral justification for the desertion of a 
dependable long-time ally and the precedent of breaking a treaty 
for the sake of expediency. To ignore the aspirations of 16 million 
people in Taiwan and force their "integration" with the Chinese 
Communists is equally indefensible. After all, less than a year 
30 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuDIES SERIES 
ago, Ford expressed the indignation of all Americans when 
Canada knuckled under the pressure of the PRC and disallowed 
the participation of ROC athletes in the Olympic games. Upon 
taking office, President Cart.er has, so far, actively carried out his 
earlier promise to campaign for human rights everywhere in the 
world. It would be incomprehensible if he chose to disregard the 
genuine wishes of the people in Taiwan, as well as those Chinese 
Americans who have business interests, investments, or relatives 
on that island. He should insist that the People's Republic respect 
and observe "human rights," before U.S. recognition takes place, 
as he did in the case of Cuba recently. The more blatant 
oppressive practices of the Peking regime aside, there have been 
too many reports that Peking has refused to grant either entry 
visas to Chinese Americans to visit their families on the mainland 
or exit permits to allow their emigration to the United States. 
Indeed, the policy of normalizing relations with Peking at any 
cost is both irreversible and fraught with grave consequences. If 
the American people know all the relevant facts, they would most 
probably oppose such a n~dical change in American foreign 
policy. Not unlike other American citizens, Chinese Americans 
would also like to see the United States get the better of the 
bargain with Peking, or at least, not again be shortchanged, as 
has happened so often in Asia in the past. 
POLICY OPTIONS 
(Abstracts) 
JAMES C. HSIUNG* 
We accept the premise that "normalization" is a set policy and 
that the Shanghai communique of 1972 is the guiding spirit for it. 
We also note, however, the sentiments of the majority of the 
American public as revealed in a Gallup poll in late 1975: While 65 
percent of those polled favNed "establishing diplomatic relations 
with mainland China," 70 percent favored "continuing relations 
with Nationalist China" (Taiwan). 
A sensible China policy for the future, we are persuaded, 
should not be conceived merely as an appendage to our 
"normalization" policy. It should embody a critical review of the 
full spectrum of U.S. foreign policy interests in ways that will 
avoid some basic flaws and misconceptions in the Kissingerian 
legacy. We should not, for example, pretend that a once-for-all 
solution can be found to all our outstanding foreign policy issues, 
the China question being one of them. There is no cut-and-dry 
answer to the Taiwan question. Even Peking today accepts the 
stark reality that the Taiwan issue will have to follow, not 
precede, the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Washington. We should take a step-by-step approach in this 
regard and leave the final settlement of Taiwan's future to the 
vagaries of history and, as we stated in the Shanghai 
communique, to the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
We should, furthermore, avoid the folly of not consulting our 
major allies when crucial decisions are made. A continued U.S.-
J a pan partnership will strengthen our hands in dealing with 
China and the Soviet Union. We should not discount lightly 
Japan's opposition to our duplicating the so-called "Japanese 
formula" and the reasons behind it. Japan could switch her 
recognition to Peking and maintain "unofficial" relations with 
Taiwan, only because slie had no defense commitment to the 
island and, more important, because she could count on continued 
U.S. back-up for the defenses of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. 
Without the U.S. commitment, stability and security in the region 
would be in jeopardy. 
Another lesson from the Kissingerian failures is that we 
should not expect, by any action on our part, to alter basic 
Chinese or Soviet policy. China, besides, is not expected 
* Professor of Political Science at New York University. 
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drastically to change its relatively limited foreign trade capacity 
in the foreseeable future, any more than its self-reliant policy. 
Peking's trade with the United States in 1976 was only $350 
million, or one-thirteenth of U.S. trade with Taiwan. Total 
Chinese foreign trade volume has remained around $15 billion a 
year, as compared to the U.S.'s $200 billion. 
For these and other reasons, we should not base our China 
policy too heavily on an over-optimistic estimate of what we shall 
gain from the establishment of full diplomatic relations with 
China. There is no reason to expect that compromising on Taiwan 
in a manner that will please Peking will offer enough inducement 
to change the latter's basic policy toward us or the Soviets. If it is 
in Peking's interest to cultivate better relations with the U.S. 
because of its own fear of the Soviet Union, it needs no 
inducement from us to carry out that policy. Our "normalization" 
policy, therefore, should not be solely premised on any real or 
imagined immediate gains for us, but on what is good for long-
term U.S. interests and what is appropriate in terms of our 
principles and moral conviction. 
The People's Republic, on the other hand, may actually 
benefit more from full diplomatic relations than we do, at least in 
the short run. As quid pro quo, we should require Peking to pledge 
to cooperate in the limitation of strategic armaments and to 
undertake not to disrupt peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific 
region. If some measure of even-handedness is to be maintained 
regarding Peking and Moscow, we should likewise express our 
concern that the Chinese respect human rights at home. 
To a large extent, a sound China policy for the future and the 
stability of the Asia-Pacific basin will depend upon the specific 
terms we shall accept for "normalization" and the (domestic) 
measures we shall take in regard to Taiwan. The People's 
Republic has insisted on three conditions for "normalization": 
diplomatic recognition, abolition of our security treaty with 
Taiwan, and withdrawal of U.S. troops from the island. Each of 
these, we believe, must be answered forcefully and unequivocally. 
We suggest the following responses: 
First, diplomatic recognition of Peking will mean withdrawal 
of recognition from Taiwan, or derecognition. We should state 
ahead of time, therefore, that switching official recognition to 
Peking will not foreclose our accepting Taiwan as a continuing 
"friendly de facto entity," so far as U.S. internal laws are 
concerned, until such time as a permanent solution is found by the 
"Chinese themselves." Giving Taiwan this intermediate status 
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will not close out future options but will for the immediate future 
free us from possible domestic legal hindrances to the continuance 
of certain rights and privileges essential for Taiwan's security and 
stability. These include arms sales, extension of OPIC insurance 
for private U.S. investments in the island, most-favored-nation 
(MFN) tariff treatment, immigration quota, etc. 
Second, our mutual security treaty with Taiwan will, as 
already noted, most probably lapse when we switch recognition. 
We should declare that the lapse will not ipso facto vitiate the U.S. 
commitment to the security of the people in Taiwan. Although a 
Congressional resolution might be an alternative route, the form 
the statement of intent will take can be a Presidential declaration 
- and this may very well be known as the Carter Doctrine in the 
future - that our continued security concerns and good will for 
the Taiwan people do not vanish after our recognition of Peking. 
We must maintain our credibility as an ally in the eyes of friends 
when seeking better relations with our adversaries. 
Third, on the question of troop withdrawals from Taiwan, we 
can tie our pledge to complete the withdrawals to an explicit 
commitment by Peking to refrain from the use or threat of force in 
the Taiwan area and to seek a peaceful settlement with the 
island's people themselves. 
Treaties with the Republic of China (Taiwan) will fall in a 
limbo when we switch recognition. There will also be ambiguity 
surrounding Taiwan's continued eligibility for certain benefits 
under U.S. laws affecting arms sales, military assistance, etc. To 
resolve these problems, the government may enumerate which of 
the treaties or legislations, insofar as the latter apply to our 
relations with Taiwan, are affected by the derecognition. 
Alternatively, Washington may simply declare that "unless 
otherwise explicitly stipulated" all existing treaties and 
legislations shall continue to apply to Taiwan as before, and then 
list the ones that the government wishes to modify or terminate. 
Where legislative action is- required, a simple formula can be used 
in a blanket Congressional resolution that reads like this: 
Whereas the United States is determined to normalize its 
relations with the People's Republic of China and recognize 
the latter as the sole legal government of China; and 
Whereas the United States adhere to the spirit and letter 
of the Shanghai Communiqued signed between the two 
countries on February 27, 1972; and 
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Whereas it is the wish of the United States to maintain 
peace and security in the Taiwan area until such time when 
the island's future is definitively resolved: Therefore be it 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress Assembled, 
(a) That the United States, for domestic legal and 
judicial purposes, shall, upon recognizing the People's 
Republic of China, continue to treat the Republic of China on 
Taiwan as a friendly political entity as though it enjoyed de 
facto recognition, at least until a peaceful settlement of the 
island's future has been reached by the people on both sides 
of the Taiwan Strait; and 
(b) That as a friendly entity as such, the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) shall continue to enjoy the privileges, rights, 
and conveniences or courtesies as it has enjoyed, and is 
currently enjoying, prior to the United States recognition of 
the People's Republic of China, pursuant to bilateral treaties, 
domestic legislations, and executive decrees and regulations, 
except as modified, altered, terminated and/ or amended as 
follows: .... 
As to the specific formula for continuing U.S. relations with 
the island after derecognition, we have noted the inadequacy of 
the "Japanese formula." The "two Germanies" formula may be 
ideal for Taiwan, but it will probably not be acceptable to Peking. 
Another way will be to reduce our relations with Taiwan to the 
consular level. But this will leave the United States ill-equipped to 
handle the kind of relations we should maintain, let alone to cope 
with any deterioration in the power balance that might destabilize 
the region. 
To assure us the greatest possible flexibility, the best possible 
formula - and this we can call the "American formula in reverse" 
- will be to switch our Embassy and Liaison Office between 
Taipei and Peking, continuing, though, the consular relations as 
they currently exist between the United States and the Republic of 
China (Taiwan). Since this formula does not foreclose any future 
settlement of the Taiwan question, and since the Liaison Office 
arrangement is currently in use between Washington and Peking, 
we see no compelling reason why Peking cannot be persuaded to 
accept this "American formula" (or, for that matter, "Chinese 
formula") in reverse, if we insist. 
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If we cannot help the 16 million people in Taiwan live out 
their aspirations, the least we can do is to avoid creating a 
condition where they do not even have a choice but to be forcibly 
taken over by Peking. United States trade with East Asia in the 
1970's already exceeded our transactions with the traditional 
European allies. America's jobs, currency, and raw materials will 
depend more than ever before upon economic ties with the Pacific 
basin. Our interests in a stable Taiwan must be viewed in this 
larger context and must not be compromised out of our eagerness 
to recognize Peking. 
Looking into the 1980's, our China policy should not fail to 
appreciate our growing interdependence as a nation with our 
Asian-Pacific partners, and to recognize that the latter's security 
and stability is crucial to our own interests. As the importance of 
the Asia-Pacific community grows, as it certainly will, we believe 
that any sensible policy must place the China question (including 
Taiwan) within that larger community context. As Asian-
Americans we think we have a particular perspective to bring to 
the public's discourses on U.S. foreign policy. 

COMMENTARY I 
HuNGDAH CHiu* 
Being the only lawyer among the panelists, my comments will 
be primarily on the legal aspects of U.S.-China Relations. 
However, because law, morality and politics are practically 
inseparable, my comments will unavoidably touch on some moral 
and political aspects of the relations. Because of the limitation of 
time, my comments will focus on the Shanghai Communique and 
the People's Republic of China's (PRC) three conditions for 
establishing diplomatic relations with the United States. 
On February 27, 1972, when President Nixon concluded his 
visit to the PRC, a joint communique was issued at Shanghai in 
which both countries, while still disagreeing on many issues, 
stated that "progress toward the normalization of relations 
between China and the United States is in the interests of all 
countries." Since then, many pro-PRC elements in the U.S. have 
been arguing for speedy normalization of U.S. relations with the 
PRC under the latter's three conditions, namely, that the U.S. 
abrogate its security treaty with the Republic of China (ROC), 
remove all troops from Taiwan, and sever diplomatic relations 
with the ROC. These pro-PRC advocates have even argued that in 
the Shanghai Communique the U.S. has already pledged to take 
these steps. Is that true? I have some doubts. 
So far as the relations between the ROC and the U.S. are 
concerned, the Shanghai Communique is a document of both 
clarity and ambiguity: clarity, because the PRC and the U.S. both 
maintain that all U.S. forces should ultimately be withdrawn from 
Taiwan; ambiguity, because the two sides have not agreed on how 
the Taiwan question should be settled. The PRC insists that the 
"liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other 
country has the right to interfere." On the other hand, the U.S. 
"affirms its interest in _a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan 
question by the Chinese themselves." These statements are both 
silent as to ROC-US diplomatic relations and as to the US-ROC 
security treaty. 
President Nixon explained the U.S. position before he went to 
the PRC as follows: 
In my address announcing my trip to Peking, and since then, 
I have emphasized that our new dialogue with the PRC 
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would not be at the expense of friends . . . . with the 
Republic of China, we shall maintain our friendship, our 
diplomatic ties, and our defense commitment . . . . (Empha-
sis added.) ("U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, The 
Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report to the Congress by 
Richard Nixon," (February 9, 1972), in Department of State 
Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, No. 1707 (March 13, 1972), p. 330). 
This position was affirmed by Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger at a press conference held on February 27, 1972 after the 
issuance of the Shanghai Communique. The pertinent colloquy is 
as follows: 
Q. Why did not the United States Government reaffirm its 
treaty commitment to Taiwan, as the President and you have 
.done on numerous occasions? 
'Dr. Kissinger: ... Let me ... state in response to this and 
any related question - and let me do it once and not repeat 
it: We stated our basic position with respect to this issue in 
the President's world report [of February 9, 1972] in which we 
say that this treaty will be maintained. Nothing has changed 
in that position . . .. the position of the world report stands 
and has been unaltered. ("President Nixon's Visit to the PRC 
- News Conference of Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Green," 
(Shanghai, February 27, 1972), in Department of State 
Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, No. 1708 (March 20, 1972), p. 428). 
On the question of Taiwan, the U.S. declared in the Commu-
mque: 
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either 
side of Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and 
Taiwan is a part of China. The United States government 
does not challenge that position. (Emphasis added) 
It must be pointed out that anyone with an elementary 
knowledge of international law should know that the phrase, 
"does not challenge" is not equivalent to a recognition of the 
Chinese claim. This interpretation is also confirmed by a high 
official of the U.S. government. Soon after the issuance of the 
Shanghai Communique, Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian Affairs Marshall Green denied that the communique 
represented any change in the position held by the U.S. since 1950 
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that the status of Taiwan is as yet undetermined ("Transcript of 
['Meet the Press'] T.V. Interview with [Marshall] Green," Mainchi 
Daily News, March 29, 1972, p. 2). 
Moreover, the term "China" mentioned in the Communique 
has a different meaning to people on either side of the Taiwan 
Strait. To the people of Taiwan, the term "China" means the 
Republic of China, i.e., a country whose social system is based on 
individual freedom and private enterprise. There has not been the 
slightest evidence that the people of Taiwan want to be a part of 
China if the term "China" means the People's Republic of China, 
that is, a country whose social system is based on totalitarianism 
and collectivism. If the policy makers in the U.S. and the PRC had 
the moral courage to accept the challenge of an internationally 
supervised plebiscite or poll conducted in Taiwan, I can assure 
you that the great majority of the people there would reject any 
proposal to make them a part of the PRC. Thus, even in 
accordance with the Shanghai Communique there remains 
absolutely no legal, moral, or political basis for the U.S. "not to 
challenge" the PRC's claim to Taiwan; the Communique does not 
imply, either in law or in its plain meaning, a U.S. acquiescence in 
the PRC's claims to Taiwan. 
In view of the above analysis, under the Shanghai Commu-
nique there is no legal or political basis under which the U.S. 
would be obliged to accept the three conditions of the PRC in 
normalizing relations. Some pro-PRC elements have argued that 
there was a tacit, implicit pledge in the Shanghai Communique or 
by President Nixon or Secretary of State Kissinger to accept the 
three conditions. Even so, then, this raises two very serious 
questions: (1) Has the U.S. government clearly explained this 
point to the American people and American allies? (2) Does the 
U.S. President or the Secretary of State have the constitutional 
authority to commit the U.S. to such a secret agreement? In other 
words, would such an agreement be binding? Needless to say, the 
answer to these questions must be negative. 
Moreover, in 1975, the U.S. State Department publicly 
declared that any explicit commitment made by the President 
toward a foreign country has no legally binding force. The 
Department indicated that it does not even keep records of exactly 
how many commitments are made by American Presidents or of 
their terms. (See "A President's word not legally binding." The 
Sun [Baltimore], July 9, 1975, p. A2). If an explicit commitment 
made by a President alone is not legally binding, how can a secret 
declaration of intention or agreement, if any, made by any U.S. 
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President, have any political or legal meaning at all in the eyes of 
the American people? 
With respect to the U.S. Security Treaty with the ROC, we 
should recall that a ratified treaty, according to the Constitution 
of the U.S., is part of the "supreme law of the land." According to 
the U.S. Constitution, a President, before he enters on the 
execution of his office, must "solemnly swear" that he "will to the 
best of [his] ability, preserve, protect and defend, the Constitution 
of the United States." Now, some pro-PRC elements urge the 
President of the United States to abrogate this treaty at the 
demand of a foreign country, by passing by Executive fiat the will 
of the people expressed through the Senate's ratification process. 
Isn't that absurd? 
The racial aspect of the question of accepting the PRC's three 
conditions for establishing diplomatic relations should not be 
overlooked. The great majority of Senators and Congressmen of 
Asian origin and the black caucus in the Congress have indicated 
their opposition to termination of diplomatic relations and the 
security treaty with the ROC as the price for normalizing relations 
with the PRC. On the other hand, the U.S. government officials 
and scholars consulted by the government who have advocated 
the acceptance of the PRC's three conditions are almost all white. 
In formulating their policy suggestion to U.S. government, they 
have excluded the participation of Asian-American political and 
academic leaders who have strong cultural, trade, emotional and 
family ties with the people of Taiwan. This exclusion of the 
participation of Asian-Americans in the decision-making process 
concerning a question of their vital concern is evidenced by the 
lack of Asian-Americans among the State Department's high 
officials dealing with East Asia, the State Department's policy 
panel on China, and the membership of the National Security 
Council. 
On the other hand, the white immigrants from the three 
Baltic states have exerted strong influence on the U.S. policy 
toward the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that these three non-
existent states were annexed by the Soviet Union almost four 
decades ago, the United States has continued to grant them 
recognition and has maintained diplomatic relations with their 
legations here. 
In my view, the real situation facing the U.S. in its China 
policy today is that there are, in fact, two Chinese governments, 
each controlling large territories and governing effectively. 
Because the PRC is a reality and a world power, it is certainly in 
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the interest of the U.S. to normalize relations with her. But in 
pursuing that course, it is equally important to face the reality of 
the Republic of China on Taiwan and its 16 million people. 
The Republic of China on Taiwan is closely linked with the 
U.S. in political, economic and cultural ties. It has a steadily 
expanding gross national product, now at the level of about $17 
billion annually. The per capital income of $800.00 in 1976 is 
about four times than that of the PRC. Its present annual foreign 
trade of about $15 billion is more than that of the PRC. In 1976, 
the ROC-US trade reached the record level of $4.8 billion, which 
was about 13 times that of the PRC-US trade in the same year. 
Moreover, more than 200,000 U.S. tourists visited the ROC in 
1976, compared with less than 5,000 who visited the PRC in that 
year. The ROC has also strong ties in all aspects with many 
Asian-Americans in this country. 
In view of this situation, the only realistic, moral and legal 
policy of the U.S. toward China is to recognize each Chinese 
government - the PRC and the ROC - as the government of the 
territory it controls. At the same time, the U.S. should also make it 
clear that it will not object to the unification of China if it can be 
achieved by peaceful means. There is nothing in the Shanghai 
Communique which would legally prevent the U.S. from taking 
such a policy toward the two Chinas, and this is the only policy 
which is consistent with principles of international law, justice, 
and respect for human rights and self-determination - all 
principles this great democracy has cherished since the founding 
of this republic two hundred years ago. 

COMMENTARY II 
YING-MAo KAu* 
The panel organizers and the paper writers should be 
congratulated on the excellent choice of topics and themes for our 
panel and on the superb presentation of the papers before us 
today. The three background papers lay out chronologically the 
historical and political contexts of the evolution of Sino-American 
relations for the past century or so; and the position paper 
articulates systematically and imaginatively the major problems, 
issues and policy options that confront our China policy in the 
years ahead. 
I am very pleased to note that all the papers have stressed the 
complexities and intricacies of the temporal and spatial contexts 
of changing U.S.-China relations in each historical period. 
Throughout the presentation the panel has lucidly underscored 
the methodological assumption that before we raise the policy 
question, "Where do we go from here?" we have to know, "How 
did we get here in the first place?'' The papers demonstrate 
uniformly a strong sense of intellectual realism and integrity. 
They all share the view that in making foreign policy no nation 
can afford to forsake the moral obligations which it has 
accumulated over time or ignore troublesome conditions as if they 
simply did not exist. The papers remind us that the success of a 
foreign policy depends primarily on meticulous analysis of 
objective conditions and dispassionate reasoning and planning, 
and not on its political rhetoric or ideological attractiveness. For 
many Asian-Americans, the issue of US-PRC normalization and 
the problem of Taiwan can easily evoke deep ideological and 
partisan emotions. It should be noted, however, that the papers 
before us today demonstrate an impressive level of objectivity and 
scholarship. 
As I find little disagreements with the historical analyses of 
various periods which are- presented with impeccable competence 
by Professors Tang, Yang, and Chang, my comments will be 
confined primarily to the policy matters discussed by Professor 
Hsiung. I am particularly impressed by the argument that our 
policy toward the Asia-Pacific region in general and toward the 
PRC in particular should be designed to achieve, among other 
things, (1) further consolidation and development of our leader-
ship role and of the credibility of our policy in Asia, (2) the 
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preservation and maintenance of the peace, stability and 
prosperity of the region, (3) the strengthening of our political and 
economic ties with our major ally, Japan, and (4) the completion 
of our normalization with the PRC with a guarantee that the 
Taiwan issue should be settled peacefully. While agreeing with the 
thrust of these analyses and arguments, I wish to raise three 
specific points for further discussion: one concerns the future 
strategy of the U.S. in Asia, and the others are related to the 
question of normalization and Taiwan. 
First, in recent years the legacy of Kissinger's diplomacy, as 
Professor Hsiung correctly pointed out, has led many Americans 
to believe that a fundamental transformation of the international 
system has taken place in the 1970s: cold-war containment and 
confrontation between the East and the West have come to an 
end, and a new era of detente and cooperation has begun. The 
bipolarized world of the post-World War II years has been replaced 
by a new order based on a triangular balance of power. Hence, it 
is argued, the old strategic concepts, such as alliance and 
containment, which were stressed in the past to deal with the 
expansion of Communist influence, are now obsolete and should 
be discarded. 
Surely, the basic alignments of world politics have changed 
substantially between the fifties and the seventies. But is it true 
that the traditional strategic concepts of our foreign policy have 
all become inoperative? The answer clearly depends on a number 
of factors: for instance, on the extent to which the basic nature 
and process of East-West rivalry has been altered, and on the 
extent to which the major Communist powers have begun to share 
our new perception and new optimism, and have shown us clear 
evidence of their willingness and commitment to cooperate in 
creating a new world order. I am not sure that the answer to these 
questions can be entirely positive. Nor am I sure that in the arena 
of foreign policy and world politics one should dichotomize 
strategic concepts such as confrontation and cooperation, or 
containment and detente as mutually exclusive categories in 
policy formulation. The conduct of world politics, in my judgment, 
is simply too complex and dynamic to fit into any of these neat, 
clear-cut formulas. 
I think, therefore, that any unilateral reorientation toward 
detente and goodwill on our part in Asia without due regard for 
the long-range objectives and short-term tactics of our adversaries 
would be, to say the least, unrealistic and naive. Such a move may 
even run the risk of miscalculation and misunderstanding, and 
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may precipitate opportunistic actions which would undermine the 
existing stability and balance of power in Asia. History has 
amply testified that effective diplomacy ought to be flexible and 
reasonable, yet realistic and firm. 
Second, I wish to raise the question as to how high a priority 
the PRC seems to give to the goal of liberating Taiwan on its 
foreign policy agenda? Do they rank it No. 1 or No.2 in priority? 
Is it the case that Peking has assigned the Taiwan issue a priority 
below that of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the threat of "social 
imperialism" all over the world? Citing Keng Piao's statement of 
last fall that "Even if Sino-American relations were normalized, it 
would still be impossible to liberate Taiwan," Professor Hsiung 
concludes that Peking appears to be willing to accept the 
separation of the normalization issue from that of Taiwan. In 
other words, the PRC is believed to be interested in completing the 
process of normalization with the U.S. on the basis of the 
Shanghai Communique (specified in terms of the "three basic 
conditions"), while allowing the Taiwan problem to be settled 
separately and "peacefully" at an undetermined future date. Is 
this indeed the real intention of Peking? Or is it more likely, as 
suggested by Professor Chang, that Peking is pursuing a "two-
phase" tactic with regard to Taiwan: namely, to disengage the 
U.S. politically and militarily from Taiwan first, and than to press 
on the Taiwan question at a time and under a condition of 
Peking's own choosing? 
If we take Keng Piao's words at their face value, considering 
them sincere and trustworthy, as some specialists would argue, 
how can we reconcile Keng's moderate words with the militant 
statement made by Li Hsien-nien just last month, in which he 
asserted that the Taiwan problem could not be resolved without a 
fight. Worse still, how are we going to handle the even greater 
uncertainties as to who will be in charge in Peking in the years to 
come, and what policy lines with regard to Taiwan they may 
pursue? 
The conclusion seems clear: if we are serious about our 
commitment to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question and 
to the security and aspirations of the sixteen million people on the 
island, the U.S. can not rely solely on informal understandings 
and pledges from the leaders in China who happen to be in power 
at this time. There is no substitute, in my opinion, for a formal 
and concrete arrangement which will involve all the three parties 
concerned. Informalities and ambiguities can only lead to 
misunderstanding and miscalculation with disastrous consequen-
ces. 
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Finally, I am rather surprised to see that none of the papers 
today has touched on the subject of Taiwan's military capability 
to defend itself in the event of a decision by China to liberate 
Taiwan by force following U.S. military disengagement from the 
island. As we know, with American military and technical 
assistance in the past three decades Taiwan has developed fairly 
efficient military forces with some sophisticated modern weapons. 
Time does not allow me here to discuss the special characteristics 
(strengths as well as weaknesses) of the armed forces on Taiwan. 
However, military specialists seem to be unanimous in their 
opinion that its strengths notwithstanding, Taiwan's military 
forces alone could not sustain a prolonged armed assault from 
China. Some would even go further to argue that psychological 
warfare by China coupled with the threat of force alone would be 
sufficient to seriously disrupt the trade-oriented, capital-intensive 
economy of Taiwan, and effectively undermine the island's social-
political stability in a relatively short period of time. 
In recent months, the so-called "Vietnamese formula" for 
resolving the Taiwan problem seems to be gaining increasing 
acceptance in certain quarters. The formula stresses in essence the 
building up of Taiwan's military strength and stockpile of 
necessary arms supplies prior to American derecognition and 
withdrawal from Taiwan with the hope that Taiwan would be 
able to maintain its own security vis-a-vis the PRC. In view of the 
peculiar economic and military conditions on Taiwan as well as 
the extraordinary strength that the PRC is capable of mobilizing 
if it chooses to do so, the pitfalls of such a formula are obvious. 
Overestimation of Taiwan's military and economic capabilities at 
this juncture is bound to result in a gross miscalculation with 
disastrous consequences for Taiwan in the future. In order to keep 
good our promise to protect the security and aspirations of the 
sixteen million people of Taiwan, it is eminently more sensible for 
us to take the trouble now to work out an unambiguous policy and 
course of action which can guarantee the objective of peaceful 
settlement that we have set out to achieve. We as a nation should 
not allow ourselves to indulge in temporary expediency and self-
deception which in the long run may trap us in a worse dilemma 
and greater trouble. 
COMMENTARY III 
KING c. CHEN* 
I enjoyed reading these four papers, particularly Professor 
James Hsiung's, which is well deliberated and carefully phrased. 
Within the time limit, I will briefly discuss first the historical 
background of U.S.-China relationships and then turn to policy 
considerations. 
Beginning from Anson Burlingame's diplomatic service for 
China in 1867 as elaborated in Professor Tong's paper, the U.S. 
has been more friendly to China than have been other big powers. 
Although the United States and China mutually made mistakes 
in the past century, the two countries generally remained friendly 
to each other. But when we broaden our perspective of Sino-
American relations, we see Russia after Japan watch the situation 
closely for any possible gains from China that have directly or 
indirectly discredited the U.S. relationship with China. Several 
historical events bear out this observation, such as Russia's thinly 
disguised rejection of the Open Door Policy, Soviet aid to China in 
1937-39 to deter Japan from advancing rapidly to northwestern 
China, the unjustifiable Yalta secret agreement, and Stalin's 
assistance to the PRC in the Korean war against the United 
States. In sum, from friendship to hostility between China and the 
United States, the Soviet factor, whether behind the scenes or not, 
has played an important role in the changing courses of 
development. 
The "reopening" of China in 1972 involved once again the 
Soviet Union. It is no longer a secret that the Peking leaders 
turned about face to the United States for assistance in opposition 
to the U.S.S.R. This is a dramatic and effective strategy. In our 
search for a new U.S.-China relationship today, we should bear in 
mind this historical and strategic background. 
In several statements by President Carter and other officials 
in the past year, the present Administration has set forth a few 
basic principles for developing new relationships with the People's 
Republic of China; they are normalization of U.S. relations with 
the PRC, maintenance of peace and stability in Asia, and 
preservation of freedom and security of Taiwan. To develop such 
new relationships, the United States, as President Carter declared 
at the United Nations on March 17, 1977, will act in "the spirit of 
the Shanghai Communique." 
What is the "spirit" of the Shanghai Communique? There has 
been no official definition of it, nor is theYe an established public 
* Professor of Political Science at Rutlfers University. 
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consensus. Unlike "the Bandung Spirit" of 1955 which is 
generally understood to mean "peace, good will, conciliation, anti-
colonialism, and unity of Asian and African nations," the "spirit 
of the Shanghai Communique" is vague in its meaning and not at 
all specific. 
If we leave the "spirit" aside and examine the Shanghai 
Communique itself, we find that it is a document of clarity and 
ambiguity. It contains one agreement (clarity) and three non-
agreements (ambiguities) which take the form of unilateral 
declarations or non-declarations by either side. The one agreement 
(the only one) is on the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military 
installations from Taiwan. The three non-agreements are compli-
cated. The first is the U.S. reaffirmation of its interest in "peaceful 
settlement" of Taiwan, while China declares that the settlement of 
Taiwan is "China's internal affair in which no other country has 
the right to interfere." In the second, the United States does not 
"challenge" China's unilaterally declared position on her opposi-
tion to "two Chinas," "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two 
governments," and other devices. This is neither an agreement 
nor a disagreement. As regards the third non-agreement, there is 
no mention, let alone agreement, of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual 
Defense Treaty. On this third point, one may well ask: Was 
Peking's later proposal for the abrogation of the Mutual Defense 
Treaty, as one of the three Chinese conditions for normalization, 
made in the "spirit" of the Shanghai Communique? 
Both the Shanghai Communique and President Carter's 
statements have expressed continuing U.S. interest in peaceful 
settlement of Taiwan and of disputes in Asia. It is a lofty principle 
and we must uphold it. Moreover, Peking, through Keng Piao's 
secret speech on August 24, 1976, expressed its intention to 
separate the issue of U.S. diplomatic recognition from the future 
settlement of Taiwan. An open statement by Deputy Premier Li 
Hsien-nien in March 1977 also indicated that Taiwan was not a 
priority issue for China and that China had many other more 
urgent things to do, such as further development of relations with 
the U.S., national defense, and modernization plans. If Peking's 
intention and priority here are real, then the PRC is going to 
"normalize" relations with Washington in the near future and to 
"settle" the Taiwan issue at a later time. Furthermore, we Asian-
Americans understand well that American public opinions play a 
very significant. role in formulating United States foreign policy. 
In October 1975, a Gallup poll showed that while 61 percent 
favored U.S. diplomatic relations with the PRC, at the same time 
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70 percent favored the continuation of formal relations with 
Taiwan. Could the U.S. government ignore such a clear expres-
sion of American public opinions? 
For the above reasons, we see that "normalization" is not as 
simple as "an invitation to dinner." It is a complex process; many 
principles and interests should be observed, and many problems 
should be dealt with. If a new American China policy, under the 
name of the "American formula" or "Asian-American formula," to 
be more fashionable on today's occasion, is to be developed and 
applied in accordance with the aforesaid three American princi-
ples, the United States should either obtain Peking's agreement 
on, or declare its determination to uphold, the following five items 
of interest: 
1. Improvement of relationships with Peking to formal 
diplomatic recognition, but no date should be set. 
2. Peaceful settlement of Taiwan by the Chinese themselves. 
3. Prior to a peaceful settlement, Taiwan continues to be a 
friendly political entity to the United States with diplo-
matic delegation in Washington and America's diplomatic 
mission in Taipei. 
4. The continuation of U.S. commitment to the defense of 
Taiwan pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty until a 
peaceful settlement is implemented. 
5. Human rights of the 16 million people on Taiwan should 
be respected. They should not be handed over to any 
regime against their will and rights. The Jeffersonian 
concept of the "general will of the people" must be upheld. 
This package of normalization is mostly in disagreement with 
Professor Hsiung's proposal. But the issue here is not agreement 
or disagreement among the panelists, rather it is whether Peking 
will accept it. Judging by Peking's public attitude toward the 
issue, I see little likelihood that Peking will readily do so. But, if 
we ponder the issue further, there is a possibility that Peking may 
consider it hard and may eventually accept it in principle. The 
reason is twofold. First, this package is an American (not anyone 
else's) proposal, and it is a matter of negotiation principle and a 
game strategy that the U.S. should lay down its own conditions as 
bargaining chips. Why should the U.S. offer all its chips to Peking 
without bargaining or negotiations? Second, Peking has the 
unpublicized intention of separating the Taiwan issue from U.S. 
diplomatic recognition, as discussed earlier, and has adopted a 
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give-and-take strategy as disclosed by Keng Piao (to take 
advantage of improved relations with the U.S. against the Soviet 
Union, and to give in on certain issues including Taiwan). After 
all, Peking, in accepting this package in principle, still has the 
right to declare its position on Taiwan or its disagreements with 
the United States as it did in the Shanghai Communique. 
I believe that peaceful settlement between the PRC and 
Taiwan should be a major and firm interest of America's new 
China policy. As a matter of fact, the United States has repeatedly 
declared its importance. The United States must insist on its 
implementation so as to ensure the maintenance of peace and 
stability in Asia. If there are any important principles in accord 
with the "spirit" of the Shanghai Communique, this is definitely 
one of them. 
My conviction of a "peaceful settlement" goes much deeper 
than the search for a solution to the Taiwan problem. Although it 
may be out of proportion to discuss it here in detail today, I will 
briefly mention my main ideas. In historical perspective, China 
has experienced hundreds of wars and armed conflicts in the 
dynastic cycles of division and reunification. These wars have 
helped bring China a glorious history and civilization and 
countless great heroes, but also untold human tragedies and 
impoverishment. The history of modern China, so clear and 
familiar to all of us, is an epitome of such glorious-tragic records. 
Political leaders in modern times (whether warlords or armed 
revolutionaries) have known only how to scramble for power and 
how to wage wars; little economic reconstruction was introduced, 
little social innovation was initiated, and almost no scientific and 
technological progress was made to improve the quality of the life 
of the people. Worse still, wars created opportunities for foreign 
powers to exploit and divide China, particularly for the neighbors 
in the east and in the north. Strongly determined to eliminate all 
wars in the future, Dr. Sun Yat-sen introduced a parliamentary 
system into China with the hope that the Chinese could settle all 
their differences and disputes by nonviolent means in meeting 
chambers rather than on the battlefield. Sun did not succeed in 
this lofty yet difficult task because he lacked the power to enforce 
it. But we must continue to campaign for nonviolent settlement of 
all Chinese affairs. The Taiwan issue today is a good case to set a 
precedent for it. 
To set such a precedent, the United States should offer its 
help, and only the U.S. can help. The American commitment to 
Taiwan since 1954 should be used as a leverage for the 
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achievement of a nonviolent settlement. The power of enforcement 
is in American hands. Moreover, dealing with the Soviet Union is 
in both American and Chinese interests. If the U.S. can develop 
with China a common interest in coping with Russia, Washington 
may have the necessary leverage to enforce such a peaceful 
settlement. Any bloodshed between the Chinese on both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait will not serve the interests of the U.S. or China, 
but it may serve those of the U.S.S.R. 
What would happen if the U.S. leverage fails to work? Since 
the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is merely symbolic and risks no 
war, we must be patient. The United States should not give up this 
leverage and task; it should continue to honor its commitment to 
Taiwan until such a time when both Peking and Taipei come to a 
peaceful solution. 

COMMENTARY IV 
TEH-KUANG CHANG* 
For the national interest of the United States, the "normaliza-
tion" of relations with the People's Republic of China is not 
simply a matter of extending diplomatic recognition to the Peking 
regime, but a step-by-step process of settlement of existing 
disputes between these two nations. For American diplomatic 
strategy, it would be wise to keep the options open rather than to 
consider raising the Liaison Office in Peking and downgrading 
the Embassy in Taipei. 
As the leader of the free world, and with the capability of a 
super-power, the U.S. diplomacy on "normalization" should be 
based on a concrete reciprocity rather than one-sided concessions 
from the U.S. Thus the American strategy should include a series 
of countermeasures for the purpose of promoting world peace, 
preserving the regional security of Asia as well as protecting the 
national interest of the U.S. 
1. On World Peace: The People's Republic of China is a 
nuclear power, but it has neither signed the Treaty of Nuclear 
Test-Ban, nor the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Wea-
pons. It has the largest army in the world; however, it did not join 
the disarmament negotiations such as the SALT talks. If the 
"normalization" is an approach for world peace, to bind the PRC 
to a disarmament negotiation table should be a priority issue for 
any negotiation for diplomatic relations. 
2. On the regional security of Asia: The "Shanghai Commu-
nique" of February 28, 1972, set up the terms for the withdrawal of 
American military personnel from Taiwan as international 
tensions diminished. At that time, it was made on the assumption 
that Community China would influence a peaceful settlement of 
Viet Nam. However, South Vietnam was conquered by North 
Vietnam by war rather than by peaceful settlement as the U.S. 
expected. The U.S. has kept its promise to withdraw its military 
personnel from Taiwan, even though the international tension in 
Asia has not been diminished. North Korea still threatens a 
possible attack on South Korea, and the Communists remain 
fighting on the border of Thailand and Malaysia. Thus the U.S. 
should seek a guarantee from Communist China for a peaceful 
settlement of the Korean problem and to refrain from supporting 
the Communist guerillas in Southeast Asia. This is not only an 
* Professor of Political Science at Ball State University (Muncie, Indiana). 
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approach for stability and security in Asia, but also for the 
facilitation of the U.S. withdrawal of troops from Korea. 
3. On the U.S. Alliance: Communist China's formulas for 
"normalization" of relations with the U.S.A. includes three 
conditions: (1) the severance of diplomatic relations with the 
Republic of China, (2) the abolition of the Embassy of the 
Republic of China in Washington and the American Embassy in 
Taipei, (3) and the abrogation of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty 
between the Republic of China and the U.S.A. These provisions 
are not mentioned in the "Shanghai Communique." Thus the U.S. 
has not only a sound basis to defend its position against 
Communist demands, but also could adopt counter-measures by 
demanding the abolition of the 1950 Treaty of Alliance between 
the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. 
The 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty is a defensive 
one and does not specify the enemy target. However, the 1950 
People's Republic of China and Soviet Union Alliance Treaty is 
an offensive one and specifies Japan and its allies, the U.S.A. by 
implication, as the potential enemy. Thus, the U.S. has more 
reason to ask the People's Republic of China to abrogate the 
provocative Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950 as a pre-requisite for 
"normalization" of relations rather than the 1954 Sino-U.S. 
Mutual Defense Treaty. 
4. On Diplomatic Relations: In the "Shanghai Commu-
nique," the United States has indicated that it would not 
challenge the "One China Concept" which is a common position 
of the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan strait. 
The United States desires to promote the diplomatic relation-
ship with China to a "normal" level until the conditions of China 
become stabilized. However, the situation of China has not 
reached a "normal" condition, either the unification of the 
mainland and Taiwan or the unity of the political factions on the 
mainland itself. The United States has sufficient reasons to 
defend its position, because the American recognition of the 
National Government of Nanking was delayed to 1928, that is, 
until China was legally unified. If a new political change is 
finalized, such as the unification of the mainland and Taiwan, the 
United States will make any necessary adjustment of diplomatic 
relations with China. Today the United States has maintained the 
status quo until a new situation emerges, rather than prejudice the 
power-holders of China. The United States should clearly indicate 
that it is impartial in the internal political change rather than 
interfere with the domestic affairs of China. Thus, the United 
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States has maintained only one embassy in the territory of China 
rather than initiate any substitute agency of a diplomatic nature. 
It is the People's Republic of China that suggested the set-up of 
"Liaison Office" in Peking and Washington. The "Liaison Office" 
can handle more affairs than an embassy can. The ambassador 
from the People's Republic of China can see the American 
President and the Secretary of State directly. Therefore, the 
"normalization" of relationship can be carried on even without an 
embassy. However, the achievement of the "Liaison Office" is 
very limited. This is not a problem of institution, but the problem 
of function. Thus, the problem is how to develop the better 
relationship through the "Liaison Office" rather than to elevate it 
to an embassy without making any progress in this relationship. 
5. On the Peaceful Settlement of the Taiwan Problem: In the 
"Shanghai Communique" the United States insisted on a peaceful 
settlement of the Taiwan problem. The Chinese Communists 
understand the U.S. position even though they express a desire for 
"liberation of Taiwan." The "peaceful settlement" of the Taiwan 
problem is a basic policy of the United States for the maintenance 
of peace and security in Asia. However, in the summer of 1976 
while he was in power, Chang Chun-Chiao (now one of the "Gang 
of Four") with his capacity as a Vice-premier, told Senator Scott 
(R.-Pa.) that a military solution of the Taiwan problem was 
possible. Li Shien-Nien, current vice-premier, told Mr. Hamilton, 
the London Times correspondent that the problem of Taiwan 
could not be settled without a war. Chi Teng-Kuei, another current 
vice-premier, told Yomiuri Shombun correspondent (May 15, 1977) 
that the Communist China would take over Taiwan by force if 
necessary. This is certainly contrary to the U.S. position which 
was expressed in the "Shanghai Communique." Should the 
United States make a concession under such a threat or stand 
firm in defending its position to prevent a possible war over 
Taiwan? 
6. On the Principles _of American Diplomacy: In dealing with 
the People's Republic of China on "normalization," it is necessary 
to bear in mind the basic principle of American foreign policy, 
such as "morality," "democracy," and "human rights." Although 
the United States would not challenge the "One China" concept 
which is a position adopted by the Chinese of both sides of the 
Taiwan Straits, the United States should insist on the principle of 
"democracy" for the people in Taiwan to decide whether or not 
they are willing to join the mainland under Communist rule. 
Especially, the "hurp.an right~" become an issue in U.S.-Soviet 
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relations, it is unwise to make an exemption of Communist China 
simply because they have a stricter control over their people. 
7. On the Anti-American Propaganda: The "normalization" 
of relations should be approached for "friendship" rather than for 
"animosity." Since the admission of Communist China into the 
U.N., the United States no longer condemns Communist China as 
"aggressors" which was adopted by the U.N. resolution during the 
period of the Korean War. However, by contrast the Chinese 
Communists continuously denounce the United States as "impe-
rialists." The campaign of hatred of U.S. and the anti-American 
propaganda should be ended in order to establish an atmosphere 
of mormalization of "friendly" relationship. 
8. On the treatment of American representatives in Peking: 
While Communist China has set a limitation on the range of 
American travel outside of Peking, the United States also set a 
limitation on the Communist diplomats' travel outside of 
Washington. However, President Carter has recently abolished 
such limitation so that the Communist Chinese representatives 
could travel outside Washington. Especially the Chinese Commu-
nists can meet the people freely. The United States should ask for 
reciprocal treatment from Peking by allowing the Americans to 
travel outside Peking and meet the people freely. Otherwise it 
makes no sense to consider raising the status of the Liaison 
Office. 
9. On the Control of Narcotics Traffic: Since international 
narcotics traffic has become a serious problem, the United States 
should lose no chance to seek an agreement with a nation which 
produces opium and exports narcotics to the United States. 
According to Gara Hamburger, an Austrian correspondent, Chou 
En-lai told Nasser in 1965 that the Chinese Communists tried 
their best to supply the best opium to the American soldiers in 
VietNam. Congressman John R. Raxtrick stated on December 2, 
1973, that Red Chinese "friends" were sending a big amount of 
opium to the United States. Thus, the United States should take 
the opportunity during the process of "normalization" of relation-
ships to seek an agreement from Peking to stop the exportation of 
opium from China to the United States. 
10. On Internal Subversion Activities: The basic position of 
Communist China is to continue world Communism even though 
the diplomatic tactics have been changed. In order to prevent the 
Chinese Communists' strategy of expansion of Communism in the 
United States by infiltration and subversion, the United States 
should seek an agreement from the Peoples' Republic of China. 
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This would be not only in general terms of non-intervention of 
domestic but also, more specifically, prohibit infiltration or 
subversion in any form as supported by any methods by any 
groups or individuals who endanger the democracy of the United 
States. One should bear in mind the experience of the United 
States' recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. The United States 
always trusted the Soviet Union's words of promise rather than 
its deeds. Thus, the Soviet Union has a record of violation of 
agreement and treaties since the United States recognized the 
Kremlin. While the old red giant is out of control by the diplomacy 
of recognition, the United States should use this experience to deal 
with the new red giant in the "normalization" of relationships. 
The United States should make clear that it wiU proceed to the 
normalization; however, the final goal of diplomatic recognition 
can only be achieved with the fulfillment of all prerequisites. The 
United States should declare that the United States will recognize 
without prejudice any national government of China so long as 
China is unified. Meanwhile, the U.S. has no choice but to 
continue the relationship status quo with a government which has 
already maintained diplomatic relations. The United States 
should keep its alternatives open rather than shift diplomatic 
recognition from one area to another simply under international 
pressure, but in doing so it jeopardizes its basic policy of morality, 
legality and democracy. 
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